FRESCHE


Implementing Zero-Trust on IBM i




Carol Woodbury CTO, DXR Security




Pauline Brazil Ayala
VP, Compliance & Security Solutions



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Perimeter Defense

- Implicit trust
 - Allows unrestricted movement/access after initial access
- Doesn't take into account:
 - Malicious insiders
 - Accidental errors
 - Stolen credentials

Zero-Trust

- First introduced in 2004, then popularized in 2010 by John Kindervag
- Strong identity and access management greatly reduces the risk of malicious attacks and insider threats
- Trust is based on the user and their role/responsibilities rather than where they are (inside or outside of the network).


Resources:

- https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/ e/History-and-evolution-of-zero-trustsecurity
- https://techchannel.com/Trends/02/2023/ westley-mcduffie-zero-trust-security



iChime hosted by Charlie Guarino

5/17/2023



Is it ...


Least privilege access

Deny by default

Defense in depth

Regular reviews

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Implementing Zero-Trust on IBM i

Implement Security Best Practices for System Values

- QSECURITY 40 or 50
- QPWDLVL 3 or 4 (IBM i 7.5)
 - Use QPWDRULES rather than individual composition values
- QPWDEXPITV not *NOMAX here or for users
- QMAXSGN not *NOMAX
- QMAXSGNACN 2 or 3 (disable (at least) the profile)
 - If only disabling the workstation (1), must be using Named devices
- QINACTITV or short time-period to time out entire device (e.g., 5 minutes)


9


Use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

- Must implement if using Kerberos
- Implement for all users not just administrators



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Least Privilege Access

- Create profiles with ONLY the access required to perform their job function
 - Avoid copying existing user profiles!
 - Create model profiles for each role
- Obvi can't be running at QSECURITY = 20

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Deny by Default

- QCRTAUT = *EXCLUDE (Default *PUBLIC authority for newly created objects)
- Access to data is restricted (*PUBLIC *EXCLUDE) by default – this includes authorization lists (*AUTLs)
- Decryption settings



5/17/2023

Deny by Default - continued

- Exit point software access
- SSH

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- File shares (IBM i 7.5 limit use via autls)
- Navigator for i
- ACS features
- ACS client deployment



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Clean up!



- Don't start TCP/IP services you aren't using
- Don't install software you won't use
- Uninstall software no longer in use -- including past versions after software upgrades
- Remove old data
- Stay current!

Rinse and Repeat: Review these on a Regular Basis!

- System value settings
- User profile settings:
 - Special authorities from both user and group inheritance
 - Group membership
 - Private authorities
 - Inactive profiles
- Application access
- Object authorities:
 - To key database files and directories
 - Authorization lists
- Exit point access
- Navigator for i access





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POLL: What layers of security are you currently implementing?


Layers of Penetration

Corporate Network (including Firewalls & MFA)

IBM i Server

- User Profile Configuration
- Multi-factor Authentication
- IBM i Network Services
 - Remote Servers (FTP, ODBC, Telnet, ...)
 - Socket Connections
- Object Authorities / IFS Permissions
- Access Escalation Management
- Command Security
- Encryption

User Profile Blueprints



Profile Blueprints – Auto-disable/delete user profiles

Profile Compliance Report

TGSE1	PMB	2023-05-16	22:39:50

Blueprint Id	User Name	Violation Category	Violation Keyword	Violation Description	Current Value		Non-Compliance Reason	Action Status	Action Error Details
	ALAN	*ACTIVITY	DISABLE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:23/03/14, change:23/03/14, used:23/03/14, Inactive for 63 days		User profile ALAN should be disabled		
	ARPPGMR	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:19/08/16, change:20/06/15, used:19/08/16, Inactive for 1369 days, Archived = *YES		User profile ARPPGMR should be deleted		
	ARP1	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:18/10/29, change:22/03/28, used:18/10/29, Inactive for 1660 days, Archived = *YES		User profile ARP1 should be deleted		
	AVG	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:22/08/26, change:22/09/22, used:22/08/26, Inactive for 263 days, Archived = *YES		User profile AVG should be deleted		
	BISQSEC	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:18/03/08, change:20/06/15, used:18/03/08, Inactive for 1895 days, Archived = *YES		User profile BISQSEC should be deleted		
	DUTCH	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:20/11/22, change:22/09/08, used:20/11/22, Inactive for 905 days, Archived = *YES		User profile DUTCH should be deleted		
	DUTCH1	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:20/07/06, change:20/07/06, used:20/07/06, Inactive for 1044 days, Archived = *YES		User profile DUTCH1 should be deleted		
	GRACE	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:22/03/25, change:22/05/16, used:22/03/25, Inactive for 417 days, Archived = *YES		User profile GRACE should be deleted		
	KAPILA	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:22/10/14, change:23/05/16, used:22/10/14, Inactive for 214 days, Archived = *YES		User profile KAPILA should be deleted		
	PMBGRP	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on: / / , change:22/04/08, used: / / , Inactive for 403 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMBGRP should be deleted		
	PMBMYUSR	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:22/09/13, change:22/09/13, used:22/09/13, Inactive for 245 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMBMYUSR should be deleted		
	PMBTESTISL	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:22/10/18, change:22/10/18, used:22/10/18, Inactive for 210 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMBTESTISL should be deleted		
	PMBTEST2	*ACTIVITY	DISABLE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:23/03/27, change:23/03/09, used:23/03/27, Inactive for 50 days		User profile PMBTEST2 should be disabled		
	PMBTEST23	*ACTIVITY	DISABLE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:23/03/09, change:22/09/22, used:23/03/09, Inactive for 68 days		User profile PMBTEST23 should be disabled		
TELLERS	PMB1	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on: / / , change:22/03/27, used: / / , Inactive for 415 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMB1 should be deleted		
	PMB111	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on: //, change:22/11/30, used: //, Inactive for 167 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMB111 should be deleted		
TELLERS	PMB2	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on: / / , change:22/09/22, used: / / , Inactive for 236 days, Archived = *YES		User profile PMB2 should be deleted		
	RICHARD	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:20/09/11, change:23/01/19, used:21/04/29, Inactive for 747 days, Archived = *YES		User profile RICHARD should be deleted		
	SHASHI	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on:20/01/08, change:23/03/09, used:23/01/09, Inactive for 127 days, Archived = *YES		User profile SHASHI should be deleted		
	TEMPORAL0	*ACTIVITY	DELETE	User profile inactivity	Last date-sign on: / / , change:20/11/18, used: / / , Inactive for 909 days, Archived = *YES		User profile TEMPORAL0 should be deleted		

Profile Blueprints – define templates for users - quickly identify users out of compliance – option to auto enforce compliance






Profile Compliance Report

TGSE1	PMB	2023-05-17	00:44:56	
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Blueprint Id	User Name	Violation Category	Violation Keyword	Violation Description	Current Value	Blueprint Value	Non-Compliance Reason	Action Status	Action Error Details
DEVELOPERS	ALAN	*PARM	USRCLS	User Class	*SECOFR	*PGMR	User Class should be *PGMR		
DEVELOPERS	ALAN	*AUTL	TGAUTL	Authority List	*ALL	*USE	Authority to authorization list TGAUTL should be changed to *USE		
DEVELOPERS	AVG	*PARM	USRCLS	User Class	*SECOFR	*PGMR	User Class should be *PGMR		
DEVELOPERS	AVG	*AUTL	TGAUTL	Authority List	*ALL	*USE	Authority to authorization list TGAUTL should be changed to *USE		
DEVELOPERS	GRACE	*PARM	USRCLS	User Class	*SECOFR	*PGMR	User Class should be *PGMR		
DEVELOPERS	GRACE	*AUTL	TGAUTL	Authority List	*ALL	*USE	Authority to authorization list TGAUTL should be changed to *USE		
DEVELOPERS	KAPILA	*PARM	USRCLS	User Class	*SECOFR	*PGMR	User Class should be *PGMR		
DEVELOPERS	KAPILA	*AUTL	TGAUTL	Authority List		*USE	*USE authoriy should be granted to authorization list TGAUTL		
DEVELOPERS	SHASHI	*PARM	USRCLS	User Class	*SECOFR	*PGMR	User Class should be *PGMR		
DEVELOPERS	SHASHI	*AUTL	PSAUDIT	Authority List	*CHANGE		*CHANGE authoriy should be revoked from authorization list PSAUDIT		
DEVELOPERS	SHASHI	*AUTL	PSCOMMON	Authority List	*CHANGE		*CHANGE authoriy should be revoked from authorization list PSCOMMON		
DEVELOPERS	SHASHI	*AUTL	PSDETECT	Authority List	*CHANGE		*CHANGE authoriy should be revoked from authorization list PSDETECT		
DEVELOPERS	SHASHI	*AUTL	PSPRVMGR	Authority List	*CHANGE		*CHANGE authoriy should be revoked from authorization list PSPRVMGR		
DEVEL OPEDO		+ 4 1 1 7 1	DODOOMO	A 11 11 1 1 1	*OUANOE		*OLIANOE		

Profile Blueprints – configure user profile gold standards for any user profile attribute




I Activity


& Admin

A Real-time Events

TGMFA


- Multi-Factor Authentication for IBM i TELNET
 - Via modified sign-on screen
 - Via pop-up screen
- Multi-Factor Authentication Algorithms
 - SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
- Token Lengths Supported
 - 6 and 8
- Authentication via
 - Email
 - Text
 - OTP app (2FA Authenticator or similar App)







TGMFA


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
Network Security – See all incoming activity to IBM i



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Network Security – See all incoming activity to IBM i



Object Authorities & IFS Permissions – Define gold standards – quickly uncover anomalies – option to auto enforce compliance




Access Escalation Management

- Leverage least-privilege model
- > Privileged activity is permitted intentionally and audited
- ▶ Granular rules based on job function

Command Security

- ➤ Easily restrict access to sensitive commands
- > Granular rules
- Auditing and alerting

Access Escalation – Granular entitlements – can require user authentication and/or alerting when invoked



Access Escalation – Entitlement in action

Access Es	scalation (TGA	CCMGR)
Type choices, press Enter.		
Command/Program to execute	<u>dspusrprf</u>	
Swap User	*DEFAULT	Character value, *DEFAULT Character value, *NONE
Reason for Use	display user	
F3=Exit F4=Prompt F5=Refresh F24=More keys	F12=Cancel	Bottom F13=How to use this display

TGEncrypt

- Database Field-level Encryption
 - AES 256-Bit Encryption standard recommended by NIST
 - Use TG internal keys or use existing keystore data to encrypt data
- Masking Field Data
 - Create your own mask for how end-users see sensitive data
- Scrambling Field Data
 - Scramble data based on internal TG scramble algorithm or customize your own algorithm



	Contents of Q	GPL.CUSTOMER - Tgbld1(Seawolf)
	CUS_NO	CUS_NAME
1	111111111	òò¶QÕïÆÔäç-f¹BQ¶#rí)Ø/F!æSVAÿµ8ß§s¢BbÈGؾ¼QQQQiåQ-ëóx2"³P±{ĺíQ@}©JI8ØÃPÉQ#
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Next Steps

- IBM i Security Assessment
- IBM i Penetration Test

Have a project in mind? Questions?

Let us know in the exit survey, or get in touch:

pauline.ayala@freschesolutions.com info@freschesolutions.com